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November 25, 2007

Christ Jesus Victor

     Today, in the new Roman calendar, is the last Sunday of ordinary time, the feast of Christ the King.  Pius XI instituted the feast during the dark years between the world wars, when the faithful were flanked right and left by the forces of tyranny.  On one side were those who aimed to raise the State to its old place as object of cultic worship.  On the other were those who so deified the individual will that it was hard to see how they could make half-decent citizens of any earthly city, let alone the heavenly Jerusalem.  Pius affirmed both man's longing for freedom and his need to submit to authority.  Against those who preached a radical autonomy he declared that Christ is King; against the Communists and socialists of Russia and Germany and fascists in Italy and Spain, he declared that our King is Christ.

     So then, we celebrate the feast -- or we do at my parish; elsewhere it's an uncomfortable reminder that we do not ultimately govern ourselves (I once heard a sermon that demoted Christ from King to Guide, maybe a Faithful Palestinian Guide, really fine at reading tracks in the desert and finding the nearest challah).  The reading today, too, was perfect, and richly ironic.  It was the account in Luke of the conversion of the "good" thief.  And that choice invites some attention.

     There on a cross hung the savior of the world, scourged to an inch of his life, a plaited crown of thorns streaming the blood down his brow.  He was struggling to raise his body a little against the spike that nailed his feet to the wood, so that he could expand his chest to take a short breath.  His heart was growing enlarged, the pericardium filling with fluid.  He was dying.  Above his head, in three languages so that all the world below would enjoy the executioner's wit, was fastened the mocking sign, "Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews."

     Christians will readily note the most obvious irony, that the sign that was meant as mockery, or as a threat against any other would-be messiahs among the Jews, in fact told the truth: Jesus was the King.  But there's another irony here.  It isn't simply that the Romans and Jews mistook the King.  They mistook kingship itself. They could not grasp that Jesus showed himself most truly a King, and showed kingship for what it most truly is, not despite the cross, but through it.  It's the same mistake made by Adam and Eve, who wanted to be as gods, supposing that to be a god means to have your untrammelled will, regardless of good or evil, a will beyond love.  Had they wanted to be like God, they would have obeyed His command, intended in love for their good; but they wanted to be like god, like little false gods of self-empowerment and license.

     Then what a flash of enlightenment must have been shed upon the heart of the thief crucified beside Jesus, who ceases in his jeering, and recognizes that Jesus is the King, and that this is what it is to be a King, to give oneself utterly for one's people, that is, for one's enemies.  So he does not say, "I am sorry for you, fellow," or "Don't listen to them below."  He does not speak to Jesus man to man.  He speaks to him as subject to King: "Lord, remember me when you come into your kingdom."  That can make sense only if he understands, somehow, without any theological sophistication, that Jesus is both Lord and God.  He's asking Jesus not only to remember him, but to forget -- because he knows well what kind of life he has led.  Only God's memory conquers the grave; only God's forgetting cancels out our wickedness.  The thief's prayer is granted, and he enjoys a privilege unique in history: the only Christian to die next to Christ.  "This day," says Jesus, "you shall be with me in Paradise."

     But we don't know the King, and don't know what a King even is.  We preach self-actualization; read Self magazine; wrap our legs in a lotus to get in touch with our inner self; refer all matters of good and evil to the vote of our unholy trinity, me, myself, and I.  On our way from church to Sunday breakfast we passed a car with a purple sticker, reading "I Am a Goddess."  Undoubtedly.  Every man a king, every woman a goddess.  No thief, looking upon his life in sorrow and resignation; no sense that even our good deeds are so shot through with selfishness and pride that they would damn an angel who thought to do them; no inkling of a suspicion that we might be the cause of despair in others, that we have added our petty share of the ice of wickedness crushing the earth over the centuries.  No sense either of the transcendent holiness of God; or the terrible beauty of goodness; or the immaculate purity of the truth.  Not even a sane self-interest, enough prudence to cast your lot with the King, a bulwark against tyrants without and within.

     But he who has himself for a king has a slave for a subject; and she who has herself for a goddess has a devil for a devotee.

    

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Comments

I love the irony of the conversation with James and John in the gospels (which was pointed out to me by N. T. Wright) where they were arguing over who should be on Jesus' left and right when he comes into his kingdom. Jesus tells them they don't know what they are asking for - that the Father has appointed some for that position. And then he proceeds to be lifted up, titled "king", and crowned with thorns, atop the most ghastly throne imaginable, with two brigands on his left and right. A hard cup indeed...

Posted by: Wonders for Oyarsa | Nov 25, 2007 8:13:44 PM

These days, I think, it must be very difficult to find an audience, even of Christians, who can bear to hear a sermon on the sovereignty of God. A preacher must find both the wills and the intellects of his hearers impoverished about sovereignty. Not just the ideas, but the vocabulary associated with it is increasingly alien, and we have lost even the reflexes to respond effectively to the declaration that Jesus is Lord. As far as we are concerned, we are Lord. Thus the rather common objection that "I could never accept a God who ..." fill in the blank here, but it usually amounts to something like, "... runs the universe in a way that I perceive to be unsympathetic or unfriendly to me or my friends or to humankind in general, like making hurricanes and earthquakes, or creating a Hell and or consigning people there, or setting up an all-male priesthood, etc."

Posted by: Little Gidding | Nov 25, 2007 10:06:51 PM

The fascists of Spain had a problem with recognizing Christ?

Posted by: T. Chan | Nov 25, 2007 11:02:17 PM

Thank you for this short homily on Christ being King, and our King being Christ; it helps me understand better why I've long found this Sunday to be so heartening - both comforting and challenging at the same time.

Posted by: Jessica Snell | Nov 26, 2007 12:00:57 AM

One thought that I have often ponder is whether God has choices to make, in the sense that we make choices. Being God and being all which that entails, omniscient, omnipotent, all-loving, all-just, all-merciful, etc., doesn't God always will to do what is best and doesn't He have the power to perfectly act on His will? In that case, can we not refute the person who says, "God could have done that, but He chose to do this?" For example, when Christ rebukes Peter by saying, "Put your sword back into its place. For all who take the sword will perish by the sword. Do you think that I cannot appeal to my Father, and he will at once send me more than twelve legions of angels? But how then should the Scriptures be fulfilled, that it must be so?", was He not merely speaking of His right to ask assistance of His father and legions of angels, but not of what He could in fact do, that is, He did not really have that choice because to exercise that choice would be to do less than the best, for He immediately makes that point with His rhetorical question, "But how then should the Scriptures be fulfilled, that it must be so?" God cannot, by His nature, will to do less than the best and, therefore, will never have the choice of doing less than the best. This is a hard concept to accept, but it seems to me that it must be the case. In that case, then while it is true that God has free will, He like we, is also bound by His will. In His case, He is bound such that He always wills to do what is best, and in our case, that we are bound by a will that is corrupt and can only will to do what is best if He gives us such a will. Of course, only He is perfectly able to perform His will. Thus, while He is sovereign, we who are His can rest assured that He is bound to do what is best. That is His very character. Cf. Romans 8:28.

I have thought this for some time, but have often wonder if there is a heresy hidden somewhere in the concept which I just cannot see. I would appreciate the comments of others on this point.

Posted by: GL | Nov 26, 2007 9:07:11 AM

Hi GL,

I wrote a piece a while back, called The Condemnation of Philosophy, on what I perceive to be the dangers of such thinking - at least as I have found it. James Altena took great offense and exception to the essay in its original form, and he and I had a spirited discussion on the matter, in the midst of which he (rather abruptly, in my view) declared that he would no longer be communicating with me. As he is certainly a respected voice around here, it's obvious that anything I say on the matter should be taken with a grain of salt.

Anyway, if you read the essay, you'll see that I do have a problem with the line of reasoning that God, having these infinite attributes, would not have these sorts of experiences that we associate with being a sentient being. Scripture certainly speaks of him as if he does, and though he be grander than we can imagine, he has given us this language for himself. If we take the Imago Dei seriously, we ought, in my opinion, to consider that the human mind and will is a fitting picture of the divine one - such that it isn't a category mistake then for the Word of God to be incarnate in that form - restoring that image. God made man in his image, and to sever the connection of that image with his being by insisting that, in his infinity, God must be wholly different, seems to me to throw the baby out with the bathwater.

What I mean is that, though we can certainly surmise that (what is spoken of as) God's choices involve far more than that which go into a human choice, it doesn't seem right to say that they involve less. Looking at our choices must be, if we are in his image, a window into something quite real about his being. That he is perfect need not imply some sort of constrained determinism on his part, any more than that we are finite need imply this for us.

We have very limited experience with infinity and perfection, and thus should take great care when speaking of it. For all we know, perfection may still involve choosing between different perfect options. Indeed, God being as grand as he is, it seems to me that we ought to err on the side of assuming that the "options" of perfection are far more involved than the sort of options available to our choices.

I am wary of taking the philosophical attributes and trumping or relativising Biblical language with them (which I have seen people do before). My approach is to take the Biblical imagery as frankly as I can - while acknowledging that there are surely nuances beyond it that I can not understand.

Posted by: Wonders for Oyarsa | Nov 26, 2007 10:10:30 AM

Wonders,

Thanks for you input. I certainly have contemplated what you say, but is it a heresy to reach the conclusion which I posit. It certainly assigns attributes to God, which, if erroneous, means we are declaring something about Him which is not true. If, then, it is untrue, it would seem to qualify as a heresy. My question is whether it fits into one of the classic heresies. It is because I understand the limits of human reason, given that we are fallen and especially as applied to the attributes of God, that I refuse to be dogmatic about such issues unless the Church has spoken consistently on such matters throughout its long history.

Posted by: GL | Nov 26, 2007 10:50:40 AM

GL,

The closest thing to heresy that I could come up with to accuse you of (if you insist I pick one) would be Docetism - that Jesus only seemed to be human. To say that he automatically always did the right thing - it being the divine nature to do so - might be said to deny an essential portion of his humanity. Witness the temptation in the wilderness and the struggle in the garden - the biblical language implies a real struggle and a real triumph.

Posted by: Wonders for Oyarsa | Nov 26, 2007 10:58:12 AM

Wonders,

So, under your approach, is God capable of choosing to do evil? That seems to be what you are saying.

Posted by: GL | Nov 26, 2007 11:31:01 AM

Probably the point is that, as a human who is also God, Jesus _could_ have chosen differently. He could have chosen to do things a different way. He could have chosen to break His free human will away from the Father's will.

It would have been an unimaginable betrayal, or at least a very big mistake. But He could have done it, and He didn't, because He is faithful to us and obedient to God. (Probably if He had, the universe would have crumbled or something, though.)

But God chose this from before the world, and God chose this within the world. In eternity, there's no difference; it's the same choice always. God is on the cross, and creating the world, and judging us all. For Him, it's always now and it's the same eternal now, and He is the same yesterday, today, and forever.

OTOH, it's possible that "choice" is the wrong word. I mean, we choose this or that inside the universe, whereas the universe moves as God tells it to do. Choices derive from the way He set things up, not the other way around. So it's probably more accurate to think of everything God is as the same eternal action and being in one, like a rock, and all of Jesus' temporal "choices" as that rock jutting up into and through creation. They weren't pre-determined actions; they just are through all eternity.

Posted by: Maureen | Nov 26, 2007 11:38:19 AM

So, under your approach, is God capable of choosing to do evil? That seems to be what you are saying.

I don't make any claims on that. What I am saying is that I don't think there are 1,000,000 evil choices and 1 good one. Creative goodness has plenty of good to choose from.

How choice works out in eternity I don't pretend to know. But I maintain that choice is still a good word, even though all our experience is wrapped up in time. Since God saw fit to make the creature man after his image, and part of that is the creation of will and choice, I take it that there is something analogous to choice in God's being, even though it no doubt has a very different character to it in eternity. But a difference is not a negation. If any will is free, God's will is free.

Posted by: Wonders for Oyarsa | Nov 26, 2007 1:00:01 PM

In the end, it is probably a point not to ponder too closely. There are some matters beyond our comprehension and trying too hard to reach definitive conclusions about those matters only tends to error.

Posted by: GL | Nov 26, 2007 1:17:00 PM

That's certainly my instinct. Perhaps, however, there are others here that can see farther than I, that might be of more help to you.

Posted by: Wonders for Oyarsa | Nov 26, 2007 1:35:02 PM

Insofar as Jesus had both a divine and a human will within his hypostatically united person, there was always the potential for his human will to succumb to temptation--as even Jesus himself seems to admit. However, because his human will was in perfect congruence with the divine will, he did not give in to temptation, and thus became the Second Adam who redeemed the failure of the first.

Posted by: Stuart Koehl | Nov 26, 2007 2:50:38 PM

GL,

It's an excellent question. You want to avoid the error of Leibnitz, so viciously attacked by Voltaire in Candide. You don't want to say that this is the best of all possible worlds. As soon as we say that God must choose the best, we have subtly made God subordinate to a scale of good-better-best that is somehow extrinsic to himself; and that would be to place him on the same plane of being that we occupy. All we can know is that God is good, and, being good, must will the good; this affirmation, says Aquinas, attributes not necessity to God but perfection, since, unlike the case with creatures, He and his will and the good are One (this is different from the voluntarist position held by Ockham and by Muslims, that things are good because God happens to will them).

We don't know what "best" means, in this context. God need not have created at all. Would that have been "better" than his having created? Words fail us here. We know that God wills what is good -- and beyond this we don't go, so that Voltaire's satire falls by the wayside. Cardinal Dulles said in my hearing last year that we cannot claim that this is the best of all possible worlds (we don't really even know what the phrase "possible worlds" means), but we might be able to affirm that this is the best world consistent with the sorts of creatures (and the sorts of choices they have made) that dwell in it. He said "might," too.

Posted by: Tony Esolen | Nov 26, 2007 2:56:20 PM

GL

Regarding your question of a hidden heresy, I cannot think of one explicitly but I will bring up some objections that might show why your position may be problematic. That God always wills the best or the best possible world is a notion championed by Leibniz. Thomist’s would find this to undermine God’s omnibenevolence, omnipotence, and aseity. If God must will the best possible world it undermines his aseity, for he would not be free and sovereign to will the nature of Divine Providence. The notion “the best possible world” seems to have hidden within it an assumption similar to the supposition “that God must create,” which is not a Christian belief. God freely choose to create and the goodness he created was commensurate to the aseity of Divine Providence. God was not compelled to create the best possible world when he freely choose to create, he also freely choose the order and proportion of goodness given to all His creatures. Creation is Good, because God wills Goodness in virtue of willing himself, but this does not entail when he wills to create it is the “best” with no equal or superior. It is a limitation of his omnipotence for it asserts God is incapable of creating better and going beyond certain finite effects. And it undermines omnibenevolence, for “best” imposes a deficiency upon goodness and perfections. “Best” is contrary or at least inconsistent with the hierarchy of goodness and perfections found in abundance throughout the orders of God’s Creation. One might retort that this is the “best” set of hierarchies God could have created, but I find such an assertion to still be a limitation of the three Divine attributes listed above.

“Best” always asserts a limitation upon the manifold of goodness that God may will. It also seems to me that God is clearly the Best and all else is inferior. If God only wills the best, then God would not create at all. By creating God wills into being things less and other than himself, clearly not the “Best.”

Also, within our own moral reflections we should recognize that our decisions are not limited to the wrong and the right. It is often the better over the better and the worse over the worse, there is a diversity of choices and many of them are good and virtuous with none being the best. We might have always acted more virtuous. We place a limitation upon moral inquiry as well as God’s Creative Act when we restrict it to such unrealistic categories that do not take reality as it is.


Wonders,

Neither your website nor your comments on this thread seem to entail the condemnation of philosophy. So I’m assuming that was just hyperbole. (Correct me if I am wrong.) If all you wish to emphasize is that natural theology is difficult and errors are many, then I agree completely. However if you were wishing to justify a philosophical agnosticism towards God it would be a rather dubious approach to use Thomas’ words from the end of his life. I can hold without inconsistency that philosophy truthfully approaches God but is limited by the natural faculties of reason, and hold that theology perfects reason having for its object the revelation of God Himself unobtainable by natural reason, and hold that a mystical experience with the Divine transcends any inquiry of philosophy and theology, without aborting the validity of the former two. I think it is quite reasonable this is what we should all take from the life of Saint Thomas Aquinas; that any glimpse God may gratuitously bestow upon us of His Divine Nature will far exceed any received revelation or philosophical ponderings.

Though mystical experience clearly transcends natural reason, philosophy is not a vapid approach to God. From my own experience I have found great instruction and aesthetic moments of both satisfaction and wonder at the culmination of a demonstration. Philosophy provides an avenue to clarify many ideas given in revelation and is also beneficial within apologetics and is useful for approaching non-believers.
The Christian Philosopher is guided by his faith, he already knows by God’s revelation God has these perfections, but as a philosopher he seek to demonstrate to the non-believer that reason can demonstrate that such a Being exists and has these attributes.
As Thomas Aquinas himself says, “Those who use the works of the philosophers in sacred doctrine, by bringing them into the service of faith, do not mix water with wine, but rather change water into wine.” The Theologian uses the precision and method of philosophy to reach ends the philosopher might never have known before and the use of natural wisdom helps the theologian to move with accuracy and stray from error when approaching the revealed mysteries.

The Christian philosopher has two important modes of operation when approaching God from reason the way of negation and analogy. Wonders you seems to be hitting upon them in some way here:

“What I mean is that, though we can certainly surmise that (what is spoken of as) God's choices involve far more than that which go into a human choice, it doesn't seem right to say that they involve less.”

You are right. What the procedure that natural theology follows is to attribute perfections (properties) found in creatures of the Creator who is the cause of these perfections found in creatures. But since creatures have these perfections imperfectly the natural theologian - having already demonstrated God to be perfect – cannot attribute imperfect perfections to a perfect being. Thus God must have or rather more properly “must be” these perfections without any of the blemishes or contingencies that creatures have.

So when dealing with God’s volition we must be careful to not deny the real sovereignty of God’s will for that would undermine the perfection of will that we find in ourselves. Yet we must also not conceive God’s volition as having the imperfections that our will has.

This is how analogy and via negative (way of negation) work together. Analogical notions must be simultaneously different and the same and via negativa helps us to see what God is not thus illuminating the precision of our analogical attributions. To simply the example, God’s will is similar to man’s in that it is free and a perfection. Yet it is different in that is not limited like man’s volitional acts, which proceed from one proposition to another or consider the possible final causes to be obtained by one course of action versus another. God does not deliberate in this manner.

An element of agnosticism or better mystery lies within any philosopher’s understanding of God’s attributes and perfections. Etienne Gilson says “the names of such perfections denote something belonging to God, the supremely perfect being, but the manner in which these perfections belong to him escapes us, even as does the divine act-of-being which they are.” Also, the Christian philosophy must be cognizant that his philosophical knowledge about God never replaces what God has revealed to the believer. I know God exists by virtue of philosophical demonstrations, yet I believe God exists because He has revealed himself through the prophets and most excellently in Jesus Christ.

I'm sure others could say this more clearly and with less mistakes than myself, but I hope that it is helpful to some.

Posted by: Daniel De Haan | Nov 26, 2007 3:06:00 PM

>>I'm sure others could say this more clearly and with less mistakes than myself, but I hope that it is helpful to some.<<

So its not in the best of all possible words... ;)

Posted by: Bobby Winters | Nov 26, 2007 4:07:52 PM

Hi Daniel,

Thanks for that - it really is helpful. I like the Aquinas quote. It hearkens back to the vision in Revelation, where the glory of the nations are brought into the holy city. And so the glory of the ancient philosophers need not be lost, but be enlisted in the service of Christ - the Wisdom of God. You are right - it is not really a condemnation of philosophy. I should have used the word "limitation" but was looking for something to sound like Boetheius' "Consolation of Philosophy".

It is actually contemplation in the context of discussions with non-believers, where the constant appeal to the attributes of perfection are used in the way I describe in the essay. My appeal is for caution and care in doing so, because if we find ourselves with the stale picture of God like the man in the empty room we should know that we are so far off the mark its not even funny. A temptation the atheist must resist is to short-circuit all of this for cheap shots. Taking one of the omnimax attributes and showing something else inconsistent by it is rhetorically effective. But I suspect it is the same sort of thing as disproving an equation by substituting infinity for one of the variables. You can screw all sorts of things up by doing that, but you really are engaging in a kind of mathematical sophistry, and would be corrected by any serious mathematician with a more disciplined notion of how infinity must and must not be used.

Posted by: Wonders for Oyarsa | Nov 26, 2007 4:08:00 PM

>>(we don't really even know what the phrase "possible worlds" means)

Indeed, as Mr. Winters will confirm, the set of all "possible worlds" is either far too big or too loosely defined to fit within the usual confines of human logic. All the usual set-theoretical paradoxes pop up here.

Posted by: DGP | Nov 26, 2007 5:40:14 PM

"So its not in the best of all possible words... ;)"
touche

"My appeal is for caution and care in doing so, because if we find ourselves with the stale picture of God like the man in the empty room we should know that we are so far off the mark its not even funny."

Agreed. Both our Theology and Philosophy has betrayed us if it ceases to illuminate Actuality of the I AM.

I wonder how long the notion of "possible worlds" will continue to be a part of contemporary philosophy. Often I hope for some erudite philosopher to come along and finish off this limping rationalism. But then I also think that such a laborious task would require more effort than just allowing "possible worlds" to die out from its own exhaustion.

Posted by: Daniel De Haan | Nov 26, 2007 6:14:51 PM

Wonders for Oyarsa (and N.T. Wright, in the unlikely event you are reading this): That was beautiful. I never thought of it that way before.

Posted by: James Kabala | Nov 27, 2007 2:24:12 PM

God freely choose to create and the goodness he created was commensurate to the aseity of Divine Providence.

This begs the question as to *why* He chose to create. You seem to believe that if creating was the best course to take, then He had no freedom in making that choice. It could be, however, that you are putting the cart before the horse. It could be that God freely chooses to do what is best and, in the case of creating or not creating, creating was the best action and, so, He *freely* chose to do it.

Again, this is very complicated and I'll admit that we should not be dogmatic in assuming what motivated God to create or to take or refrain from taking any particular action. And it need not be a "possible worlds" argument, but it may well be that given God's attributes that no other world was possible, not because He *could not* choose otherwise but because He *would not* choose otherwise.

But please do not call it my position. I don't have a position, just ponderings.

Posted by: GL | Nov 27, 2007 2:44:46 PM

Anthony, Thanks again for your insight and your words. Whenever I read one of your articles, I know it is you even before finishing and seeing your name. The Beauty of His Word shines through you in all that you write. Blessings in this week of Christ the King.

Joseph Stringer

Posted by: Joseph Stringer | Nov 27, 2007 3:02:58 PM

Let me add my ditto as to Joseph Stringer's post of Nov 27, 2007 3:02:58 PM.

Posted by: GL | Nov 27, 2007 3:09:49 PM

I am also in complete agreement with Joseph Stringer.

GL,

I am not sure if I understand your objection. I offered no reason nor any suggestion as to why God would choose to Create.

The quotation taken from my prior post was not intended to mean this:
"You seem to believe that if creating was the best course to take, then He had no freedom in making that choice"

My quotation: "God freely choose to create and the goodness he created was commensurate to the aseity of Divine Providence." Was supposed to mean the opposite.

1) God freely choose to create:

There was no cause distinct from God's sovereign will influencing His decision to create. God created in virtue of His own free choice. What His reason was, I would not pretend to know. Etienne Gilson examines the diffusive nature of being and the good in his book "The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy," here we may find some indication of why God choose to create. There is also a collection of essays edited by Scott MacDonald in a book called "Being and the Good" that has a few articles on this very question.

To say that God created because it was the "best choice" needs to be qualified like crazy. "Best choice" only in the limited sense that is was best because God freely choose it. But never best as in He was limited to a number of options and not-creating was a lesser choice than creating. This undermines God's aseity; God's complete and perfect sufficiency in His own Goodness. To say it was best for God to create seems to imply God was not complete in Himself and greater perfection could be added to God if he was to create. This cannot be the case for God is perfection itself and cannot increase in the abundance that He eternally is.

Ergo: God freely choose to create and therefore I do not believe that creating was the best course to take.

2)"the goodness he created was commensurate to the aseity of Divine Providence":
This was perhaps not completely clear. Let me attempt a reworking of the original though. Since God did freely choose to create, he was not compelled to then create any "best version of creation." He also freely choose the order, perfection, and goods that would exist within His creation. The goodness that God created was commensurate or in proportion to the freely chosen plan of Divine Providence. The plan of Divine Providence was not the "best version of Divine Providence" such that because God chose to create he was compelled to will into being this version of Divine Providence. God also freely chose the order in which His Divine Providence would take shape.

I hope that clears things up.

Posted by: Daniel De Haan | Nov 27, 2007 11:51:47 PM

Daniel,

I agree with much that you write, but you have one assumption which I believe is unnecessary, that is that if it was "best" for God to create it was because there was something lacking in Him which He needed to be complete and which creating completed. Perhaps it was "best" to create for some other reason, such as that *we* needed Him to do so and He did so out of love -- that is, that is better to exist than not to exist and so He gave us existence, not because He needed us to be complete but because we need Him in order for us to exist. Just a thought.

Posted by: GL | Nov 28, 2007 3:56:28 AM

>>>"You seem to believe that if creating was the best course to take, then He had no freedom in making that choice"<<<

God is absolutely unconstrained in his freedom. But if the nature of God is love, as John wrote, and if love can only be expressed in relationship, then creation is an inherent part of God's nature, and God would have wanted to create in order to express the inexhaustible bounty of his love beyond the confines of the Holy Trinity.

Even while saying this, I will remind everyone that God is unknowable in his essence, and that the creature can never fully comprehend the mind of his Creator. Therefore, I would see most of this as pure (and possibly unnecessary) speculation.

Posted by: Stuart Koehl | Nov 28, 2007 5:55:14 AM

Stuart,

I agree with everything you have said in your post of Nov 28, 2007 5:55:14 AM.

Now if I could just get you to see the light on Rudy . . . ;-)

Posted by: GL | Nov 28, 2007 11:48:56 AM

GL,

I guess I do not see where in my posts you think I have this assumption:

"I agree with much that you write, but you have one assumption which I believe is unnecessary, that is that if it was "best" for God to create it was because there was something lacking in Him which He needed to be complete and which creating completed."

I do not think this at all. I think the opposite. God didn't need to create, his aseity necessitates that there is nothing incomplete in His Perfection. Creation did not add any perfections to God. So He did not create so he could be better; God cannot become any better; God is perfect. This is a necessary condition for God's aseity, viz., His being perfectly free.


Koehl
"Even while saying this, I will remind everyone that God is unknowable in his essence, and that the creature can never fully comprehend the mind of his Creator. Therefore, I would see most of this as pure (and possibly unnecessary) speculation."

I completely agree with the former. "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high; I cannot attain it"(Psalm 139:6). But I cannot agree with the later if you are implying speculation is pure agnosticism. Are the Scriptural passages that attribute perfections to God pure speculation? I agree we cannot know what the perfections are as they are possessed eminently within God. But I do think I speak truthfully when I attribute analogically that God is Just and that God has a Will. I just always must be cautious to recognize these perfections, like justice and volition, are only created likeness of the reality they have eminently as God.


Also as a side note. Could someone tell me how to add italics and embolden words?
Because [i] ... [/i] is not working for me.
thanks

Posted by: Daniel De Haan | Nov 28, 2007 12:42:40 PM

>>Could someone tell me how to add italics and embolden words?

Try using angle brackets like < and >.

Posted by: DGP | Nov 28, 2007 12:54:41 PM

Thanks GL and DGP

Posted by: Daniel De Haan | Nov 28, 2007 2:31:05 PM

A very belated comment (I've been trying to get to this for some 10 days) --

First, a big "thank you" to Daniel De Hann for stating (in his response to WfO), in a far more erudite and eloquent manner than I have mustered, the position I have sought to defend, both on and off line, regarding classical theology and the place of classical philosophy in that.

Second, to support and amplify upon Daniel's response to Stuart, certainly we cannot know God's being in its essence in a cognitive sense, except in such ways that God has revealed that to us (and we believe that within our creaturely capacities He has done so -- we know by revelation that God is omnipotent, onmiscient, all-benevolent, etc.). But the consummation of theosis is that we shall know God not conceptually but personally, intimately. Also, the discussion here of God "choosing" to do or not to do the best concerns God's energies, not His essence, and of His energies we certainly have some knowledge.

Third, in further response to Gl's question (to which some fine replies have already been made), the flaw lies in the staement:

"In that case, then while it is true that God has free will, He like we, is also bound by His will. In His case, He is bound such that He always wills to do what is best, and in our case, that we are bound by a will that is corrupt and can only will to do what is best if He gives us such a will."

As has been stated in somewhat other words, it is a mistake to consider God's nature as somehow beinga "bound" that limits His free will and action. That is in a certain sense (though not in others) true of finite creatures, but not of God, due to his infinitude. It is God's uncreated being that defines and thus bounds all lesser created beings. God is being -- the "I AM THAT I AM" -- and hence being is not something distinct from God.

To distinguish them with respect to God is to repeat the same mistake that was recently discussed on another MC thread as to whether something is God because God does it or does God do something because it is good. Both alternatives mis-state the case because "the good" is not something that exists apart from the being of God; without God we would not even know what "the good" is.

We must beware of the (ultimately gnostic) claim made by the early 19th c. German Idealist philosophers (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel), etc., who argued that man has a knowledge and power denied to God because man can know and choose to do both good and evil, whereas God can only know and choose to do good.

Because God as being is pure activity (a point made particularly by Aquinas), He is entirely dynamic and not static. Unlike in created beings that dwell in time and space, there is no distinction in God between potentiality and actuality, between becoming and being. Hence what He does is purely expressive of His being, not a limitation of it.

Hence, as Stuart pointed out, God is not in may compelled or bounded to do what is best, but He does do what is best because He is love and he is completely good. As has been pointed out here, there is a potential problem with the definition of "best"; we must be careful that ensure that "best" is defined from the standpoint of God and not of man. [This is simply the argument concerning "the good" all over again, with "best" substituted for "the good."]

At this juncture I wish to come to the defense of Leibniz, who I believe has been misunderstood here regarding "the best of all possible worlds" (having read the "Monadology" and numerous other writings while working on my onetime Ph.D. thesis). Leibniz was one of the most brilliant intellects in human history -- arguably the last universal polymath of Western culture -- and a Catholic Christian, and it would be a serious mistake to underestimate him here.

First, Leibniz understood quite clearly what I have just said, and the points made by Daniel and others, that God was not somehow compelled or bound by some logic external to or apart from Himself to create "the best of all possible worlds." Rather, Leibniz's point was precisely that God did create that world because of of His infinite goodness, as an expression and not a limitation of His being.

Second, it seems that "possible worlds" here is being confused with something akin to the "alternative universes" speculated upon by some contemporary physicists and astronomers. [As for issues in mathematical set theory, keep in mind that Leibniz was one of the most brilliant mathematicians in history. Even if set theory was not fully developed in his day, it is an extension of Aristotle's Categories as well as the work begun by the ancient Babylonians and Greeks, and he surely would not have fallen prey to any simple error in that regard either.]

For Leibniz, a "possible world" is a logical concept meaning a world in which the fundamental laws of logic -- the law of identity, ther law of non-contradiction, etc. -- operate. In other words, Leibniz is ruling out e.g. a world in which X can both exist and not exist at time X and place Y. And he is setting aside the stupid people (e.g. radio disc jockeys) who think they are being clever in saying e.g. "If God is all powerful, can He create a rock so heavy that even He can't lift it?", by exposing such statement to be language games resting upon conceptual and categtorical confusions.

Thus, only certain worlds can actually exist, and out of those God in His benevolence chose (in the proper understanding of that terms as expressive and not limiting of His being) to create that which is "best" -- i.e., that which most fully expresses His being. Whatever God creates expresses His being. Since God created something finite, he could (as an expression of His omnipotence) in an abstract logical sense have chosen to create a different world that expressed His nature to a more finite degree. However, the unbounded benevolence of God's being meant that, as an inherent expression of that, He made actual the possible finite world that most fully expressed His being within creaturely bounds. In that sense He would not have done otherwise; and one could try to argue that thus there were in fact no other possible worlds than the one God actually created. But this once again returns to the radio disc jockey categorical error of positing God's goodness as independent of His being, and thus mistakenly seeing it as a limitation rather than expression of His being.

Third, contrary to Voltaire's incredibly superficial (if sometimes hilarious) traduction of Leibniz, Leibniz did not say that this world being the best of all possible worlds means that everything that occurs within it is "good" or "for the best" in the simplistic sense of being morally good per se or immediately beneficial in a utilitarian sense. It is "for the best" in the sense that Christians believe that all things are for the best -- i.e., that nothing is outside of God's providence, and that ultimately (not in fallacious proximate terms of human desires) all evil will be turned to the service of good and the redemption of man. (Cf. St. Paul: "*All* things work together for the good of them which love God." In a recent class on the ascetical theology of Evagrius Ponticus led by my pastor, Fr. David Ousley, who did his Ph.D. thesis on the topic, I raised the question of whether ultimately there is truly such a thing as unmitigated evil. Fr. Ousley responded by pointing to the Crucifixion, which is necessarily the greatest evil there was and is and ever can be, and yet is also the greatest good ever to be given, for by it the world was redeemed.)

The problem with Voltaire, as with all non-Christians and rationalists, is his denial of the Fall. He thus miscontrues Leibniz by making it appear that the "best of all possible worlds" premise makes God the direct author of misfortune and evil. Nothing could be further from the truth for Leibniz. Leibniz understood that e.g. God could have created a world in which the Fall with all its attendant evils would, indeed could, not have occurred. But that logically would have entailed a world in which God abridged, abrogated, or never even created human free will, meaning that man would not have been truly and fully created in the image and likeness of God, which hence would have been a created world less good that the best world that he did create. God foresaw the Fall, and before all time prepared the means for its redemption as well; the Fall was a logically possible and limited proximate evil encompassed within the infintely greater good of God creating a creature in His own image and likeness who could enjoy Him eternally. Unlike Voltaire, Leibniz offered a logical analysis fully consonant with the orthodox Christian understanding of the Creation, human free will, and the Fall.

In short, Leibniz' analysis of "the best of all possible worlds" does not assert any limitations upon God's ability to choose and act; rather, it deduces from what we know about the being of God the logic of His actions the true order, meaning, and significance of His creation.

Posted by: James A. Altena | Dec 5, 2007 5:35:03 AM

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