Hiroshima

This article at Public Discourse by Christopher Tollefsen on the bombing of Hiroshima and the issue of targeting civilians in war will generate controversy. I just watched a very grim 1985 WWII film set in Belarus, Idi i smotri -- literally "Go and look" but released in English as "Come and See"), in which is depicted the Nazis rounding up villagers, herding them into a building, throwing in grenades through the windows, then setting it on fire. At the end of the film, it is noted that the Nazis burned over 600 villages in Belarus and killed all the inhabitants of them. That's targeting a civilian population.

Comments

[sdf]

It may well be no cosmic accident that the residents of Hiroshima were vaporized on August 8. The explosion was the anti-Transfiguration and our defense of it is antiChrist.

[Benighted Savage]

It may well be no cosmic accident that the residents of Hiroshima were vaporized on August 8.

If you believe that, SDF, you might find the story of Takashi Nagai (from Nagasaki, however, not Hiroshima) worth investigating.

http://nirc.nanzan-u.ac.jp/publications/jjrs/pdf/710.pdf

From Prof. Tollefsen's essay:

The Allied bombings of Dresden and Hamburg, meanwhile, deliberately targeted “built up” residential areas and killed tens of thousands of German citizens. These bombing raids were part of a strategy of demoralization in which military facilities and armament production were not the main targets. By deliberately attacking civilian populations the Allies hoped to teach their enemies a lesson and bring them to their knees.

As for Hamburg, I'd say that the planners of and participants in Operation Gomorrah would have been very surprised to find out that their targets were not Hamburg's u-boat pens, oil refineries, and shipyards. As for Dresden, the Soviet's desire to have us and the Brits bomb Dresden's major railway junction (thus protecting the Red Army from the arrival of Nazi reinforcements) were what put Dresden on Bomber Command and SHAEF's bombing schedule.

If Prof. Tollefsen can't be bothered to come to terms with basic historical facts about WWII strategic bombing that contradict his thesis -- i.e., that the Allies were guilty of a "deliberate targeting of civilian populations" -- I don't see why I (or anyone else) should take his ruminations too seriously.

[Rob G]

See philosopher A.C. Grayling's book on this issue, "Among the Dead Cities." Even if the residential civilian areas of these cities were not intentionally targeted (which I don't grant), the civilians were regarded with a degree of callous inhumanity that should make us ashamed of these actions.

[Benighted Savage]

A.C. Grayling's little propaganda tract isn't worth the paper it's printed on.

If anyone is interested in the Dresden bombing, I'd suggest looking up Frederick Taylor's _Dresden_. I re-iterate: the bombings of Dresden and Hamburg did not target civilians, and the only callous inhumanity I see is on the part of a Nazi gov't that neither cared enough to locate its military targets well away from residential areas nor (in the case of Dresden) build sufficient air-raid shelters to protect the civilians who lived next door to strategically important railway junctions and factories that built parts for tanks and AA guns.

[MCModerator]

Comment deleted for ad hominem attack.

[Rob G]

"the only callous inhumanity I see is on the part of a Nazi gov't that neither cared enough to locate its military targets well away from residential areas"

Of course. Things like this are never our fault, always the other guy's. Like when Moe yelled at Larry for not bringing him a softer board after he broke the Ming vase.

[c matt]

I have to agree w/ Rob here (and at one time, I would have thought otherwise). The fact the Nazi'a acted reprehensibly by building strategic sites near civilian populations (using them as human shields) does not justify our ignoring the fact they were bieng used as human shields and bombing anyway.

Hiroshima itself is an even more clear cut case.

[Robert Espe]

I'm sorry, but the lives of our soldiers are worth more than those they are fighting, civilian or not. Assuming you have a just war to begin with, a country's people are part of whatever evil you are fighting. If they are concerned because their own military can no longer allow them to continue in evil in peace, then they should force their military to surrender to save their own lives. WWII's Pacific theatre wasn't exactly a war of agression.

[Benighted Savage]

c matt writes:

The fact the Nazi'a acted reprehensibly by building strategic sites near civilian populations (using them as human shields) does not justify our ignoring the fact they were bieng used as human shields and bombing anyway.

I wasn't attempting to justify the Allied aerial bombing of Hamburg or Dresden by reference to the Nazis' inhumanity towards their own citizens. My point about the Nazis was just an aside. My central argument is that writers like Prof. Tollefsen, who claim that these Allied bombings were the "deliberate targeting of civilian populations," are either woefully ignorant of, or are intentionally misrepresenting, the facts regarding the Allied "bombing war."

Hiroshima itself is an even more clear cut case.

Clear-cut case of what?

Robert Espe writes:

WWII's Pacific theatre wasn't exactly a war of agression.

It was if you were the Imperial Japanese Navy or Army!

[William Tighe]

"I'm sorry, but the lives of our soldiers are worth more than those they are fighting, civilian or not. Assuming you have a just war to begin with, a country's people are part of whatever evil you are fighting."

I think that I shall have to coin a new phrase to characterize such a sentiment -- Neanderthal Christianity.

[Rob G]

~~My central argument is that writers like Prof. Tollefsen, who claim that these Allied bombings were the "deliberate targeting of civilian populations," are either woefully ignorant of, or are intentionally misrepresenting, the facts regarding the Allied "bombing war."~~

Baloney. Are you going to argue from some sort of warped double-effect principle that because the non-combatants may not have been targeted directly (which I don't grant), that it was therefore licit to bomb their neighborhoods because they were adjacent to military targets?

As Peter Kreeft once said, you don't fumigate a building even if you know it to be full of rats, if there's a chance that a child is inside.

[Benighted Savage]

Baloney. Are you going to argue from some sort of warped double-effect principle that because the non-combatants may not have been targeted directly (which I don't grant), that it was therefore licit to bomb their neighborhoods because they were adjacent to military targets?

I've been unfailingly consistent in arguing that I shouldn't feel bothered to take Prof. Tollefsen's position seriously given that he doesn't deal with the historical facts which undermine his position. Still waiting for you (or anyone else) to bother to contest what I've said about the Hamburg or Dresden aerial bombings. BTW, half-remembered impressions garnered from a copy of _Slaughterhouse Five_ read thirty years ago don't count as a serious response.

As Peter Kreeft once said, you don't fumigate a building even if you know it to be full of rats, if there's a chance that a child is inside.

Well, I certainly hope that Kreeft didn't say or write something as puerile as THAT. It wouldn't surprise me if you've taken him out of context.

To reduce the difficult decisions that Allied leaders made during WWII to a bon mot, or a neat and tidy ethical situation fit for a freshman textbook, is pure humbug.

[Robert Esoe]

Right, loving my own family more than faceless people who support evil regimes makes me a Neanderthal.

A country cannot be separated from the people within it. You cannot be at war with a country unless you are also at war with its people, who else would you be fighting? The whole distinction between military and civilian targets is pointless when you are dealing with conscripted armies. Say for the sake of argument you manage to eliminate every enemy soldier in the oposing army with 0 civilian casualties. What happens next? More former civilians get conscripted and now you have to kill the same people that you would have killed had you bombed their village, except now it costs more of the lives of your brothers, sisters, sons, daughters, fathers, mothers, and neighbors. Are we morally obligated to insure we lose as many people as we kill? Nevermind that God doesn't seem to have a problem with civilian targets in the OT. War is a necessary evil, no sense pretending it can be good for some people involved.

[Bob Srigley]

Without the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki the war could not have ended until the Japanese homeland was invaded. Then how many Japanese lives would have been lost, both military and civilian? And how much of the Japanese homeland would have been devastated, how much infrastructure destroyed? How likely is it that the Japanese would have surrendered before the last elderly man or young boy who could wield a weapon was taken out?

If the invasion proved necessary would the Soviet allies have relinquished whatever portion of Japanese territory they managed to take? The vast majority of Japanese never experienced the horrors of war in their homeland and the country was able to recover all the more rapidly because of that. Also General MacArthur's occupation was exceptionally humane.

Finally, because of the display of absolutely disproportionate power in the A-bombs, the Japanese could surrender without shame. Remember that as a rule it was not in the Japanese psyche to surrender.

I really wonder if those who expostulate about the immorality of bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki would have been up to the task if the actual decision (and the responsibility for the consequences) had been handed to them. What kind of moral posture could they assume if the choice had been for invasion with all its consequent horrors, when all along, the means for ending the war was at hand?

[Rob G]

"Still waiting for you (or anyone else) to bother to contest what I've said about the Hamburg or Dresden aerial bombings."

The Allied bombings were Sherman's March writ large: demoralize the citizenry so their nation loses its will to fight and knock out some factories and railroad stations into the bargain. Non-combatants become "collateral damage."

Guess it depends on who you read, doesn't it. You've already dismissed Grayling, and would probably do the same with the sources cited by Pat Buchanan in his book on Churchill & Hitler (which in turn I can't cite because I don't own the book. And spare me the pooh-poohing of Buchanan. I'm not using him as a source, but his sources. I trust this distinction is not lost on you.)

In any case, it seems to me that if one accepts just war arguments then targeting civilian areas with civilians living in them seems to be a no-no, whatever the greater good. You either accept this as a principle or you don't. I do. Therefore no amount of shaky moral calculus/hoop-jumping/statistic-twisting/loophole-threading makes one bit of difference to me.

"To reduce the difficult decisions that Allied leaders made during WWII to a bon mot, or a neat and tidy ethical situation fit for a freshman textbook, is pure humbug."

I never said that these decisions were simple, neat or tidy. I said they were wrong.

[Bob Srigley]

This discussion seems to have reached an impasse of sorts. Is it possible that the traditional just war prohibition against waging war against civilians was actually more nuanced than it appears? I'm thinking specifically about siege warfare. Assuming that laying siege to a city was permissible under just war parameters would that not involve civilian casualties? Bombardment by catapult or cannon would not discriminate between military and civilian. The strategy would be to induce surrender by ratcheting up the suffering shared by military and civilian alike. In some ways the aerial bombardment of a nation is not unlike the ancient siege of a city.
If the goal of the war is surrender of the enemy followed by cessation of hostilities and terms of reconciliation and not the extermination of a people or the appropriation of their homeland--and this was the goal of the Allies in WWII (excepting Soviet Russia) and the North in the Civil war--then perhaps a degree of ruthlessness may in the end be a severe mercy if it hastens the end of the war.
While I can appreciate Rob G's principled position I can only wonder what decisions he would have made if the entire weight and responsibility had rested on his shoulders.

[Benighted Savage]

The Allied bombings were Sherman's March writ large: demoralize the citizenry so their nation loses its will to fight and knock out some factories and railroad stations into the bargain. Non-combatants become "collateral damage."

And wrong is right, and up is down, right Rob G? I've been keeping it simple: please show how your revisionist account of WWII's "bomber war" in Europe applies to Prof. Tollefsen's examples of Hamburg and Dresden. Show how they were "terror" or "morale" bombed. You have yet to do so. Simple assertion, and obviation of the facts I presented without argument, don't constitute proof.

You've already dismissed Grayling, and would probably do the same with the sources cited by Pat Buchanan in his book on Churchill & Hitler (which in turn I can't cite because I don't own the book...)

Ah, so your knowledge that the Allies were primarily "morale bombing" in Germany during WWII is based upon a book (Grayling's) you're not willing to defend and nameless references from a book by Pitchfork Pat you don't have access to now. Sorry, that doesn't help much.

In any case, it seems to me that if one accepts just war arguments then targeting civilian areas with civilians living in them seems to be a no-no...

That's a lot of seeming, and its basis is a just war argument you haven't bothered to make yet. And that the Allies were targeting "civilian areas" -- whatever that may mean... I assume you mean "morale bombing" -- is the bone of contention here, and something you have yet to prove.

[David Gray]

These Observations on Strategic Bombing in World War II courtesy of a well informed former MC poster:

On bombing in World War II, generally:

1. All sides in World War II were nominally committed to bombing military targets. Once the war began, this proved more difficult than previously considered. Daylight bombing proved prohibitively expensive beyond the range of fighter escorts, which forced first the British and then the Germans to resort to night bombing.

2. Night bombing was ridiculously inaccurate for the first three years of the war, due to the blackout of cities, the jamming of navigational beacons, the presence of cloud cover over Europe, and the interference of enemy anti-aircraft artillery and night fighters.

3. Through 1942, only 10% of British night bombers managed to drop their bombs within five miles of the designated aim point. The number fell to 3% over heavily defended targets like the Ruhr.

4. Because of this inaccuracy, the British switched to area bombing, a city being the smallest target that the RAF could reliably find and hit with the technology in hand.

5. However, this was not "morale bombing"--the objective was not to demoralize the population and cause it to rise up against the Nazis, as per the pre-war doctrines of Douhet, Mitchell and Trenchard. Rather, the object was the "de-housing" of German workers, based on a theory by Churchill's scientific advisor, Lord Cherwell. Cherwell believed that German industrial output would be decreased by a measurable amount for each factory worker driven out of his house by bombing. Such workers would have to find places to live, ways of getting food, and probably would have to leave the city where they worked. Dehouse enough workers, and soon industrial production would grind to a halt. Bomber Command's campaign from 1943 onward was based on this assumption.

6. The assumption turned out to be faulty, because the Nazi Party proved particularly adept at providing housing and other services to displaced workers (dormitories, soup kitchens, etc.), which, together with propaganda and the veiled threat of coercion, kept the workers at their lathes. Also, under Albert Speer, German industry rapidly dispersed out of the cities and into the countryside, the workers being moved along with the factories. However, the British had no way to know this.

7. The RAF never deliberately set out to create firestorms. Whenever one occurred, it was generally an accident caused by a fortuitous combination of weather, building materials and bomb distribution. The British used incendiaries because they were the most effective at their objective of "dehousing". They were usually mixed in with 4000-lb high explosive "cookies", the purpose of which was to strip off roof shingles and shatter windows, to assist the work of the incendiary clusters. Despite this, only four fire storms broke out in German cities--Lubeck, Rostock, Hamburg and Dresden. Other cities, like Berlin, being of brick and reinforced concrete construction, resolutely refused to burn.

8. When it entered the war, the U.S. remained committed to unescorted precision daylight bombing of point targets like factories. In practice, the U.S. Army Air Forces were unable to do this. Targets were camouflaged, hidden by smoke screens and often covered by clouds. German flak and fighter defenses disrupted formations and put bombardiers off their game. In general, the circular error probability (a circle into which half of all bombs aimed at a particular target will fall) was 1000 meters on clear days, and 2000 meters on cloudy ones. Because German industrial cities were small, this meant most of the bombs aimed at a factory, railroad yard, refinery or powerplant would land in the residential areas as well. A British bomber pilot summed it up well in a post-war conversation with an American counterpart: "We area bombed area targets, and you area bombed point targets"--the objectives were different, but the result was the same.

9. Despite the inefficiencies, the combined bomber campaign did make an important, perhaps decisive contribution to the Allied victory over Gemany:

a. It diverted huge amounts of resources in manpower and munitions to anti-aircraft defense which otherwise could have been used against Allied ground forces. Consider that something like 1 million German troops were manning some 10,000 flak guns, each of which could also be used as an anti-tank gun. If each of those guns killed just one tank, the war would have gone on much longer.

b. The bomber offensive also forced the Luftwaffe to bring its fighters back to Germany to defend the cities, which meant they weren't bombing and strafing our troops over the battlefield. Defense of the Reich also inflicted heavy attrition on the German fighter force, particularly after the P-51 Mustang was able to escort U.S. bombers to Berlin and back.

c. The bombing did affect industrial production, in two distinct yet synergistic ways. First, it forced the Germans to disperse their factories, with various components of weapon systems being built at different locations and then moved to another plant for final assembly. This in itself degraded German production, as it was difficult to coordinate the various dispersed plants and ensure the quality of their output--many subsystems and components either did not fit well, or did not work properly in the finished system. As the Allied air offensive began to focus on transportation and oil targets from March 1944, it became difficult for the Germans to move raw materials to component factories, and components to final assembly plants.

d. Shortages of fuel seriously affected German training and combat operations.

e. Though the attacks did not break German morale, it did undermine the credibility of the Nazi regime, which was shown unable to protect the German people from attack. This in turn led to shirking and passive resistance towards the end of the war, and passive acceptance of the Allied occupation. The successful de-nazification of Germany was in part due to the discrediting of Naziism as an effective form of government.

9. It should be recognized that one makes war with what one has, not with what one would like to have. From 1940 to 1944, bombing was the only means by which the British and Americans could strike back at Germany--and it was necessary to strike back, both to bolster Anglo-American morale, and to demonstrate to a highly suspicious Stalin that we were really in the war, despite being unable to open a "second front". Given the limitations of bombing technology in World War II, it was inevitable that cities would become targets, either deliberately or by accident, because that's the best we could do with the tools at hand.

10. The choice was not, therefore, to bomb precision targets or to "terror-bomb" the German population, but rather to bomb cities in the hope of hitting military targets (or to bomb military targets knowing that one would hit cities), or not to bomb at all. In the context of the times, that was not an option.



With regard to the bombing of Japan, both conventional and nuclear, the following has to be taken into consideration:

1. When the U.S. began bombing Japan, first from China, then from the Marianas, it was committed to implementation of its precision bombing doctrine. The targets were aircraft factories, engine factories, steel mills and shipyards.

2. The results of these missions was disappointing. First, the B-29, which had been rushed into service, suffered from poor reliability--it was especially prone to engine failure when lifting heavy payloads to high altitudes over long distances. Second, flying at 30,000 feet, the B-29s for the first time encountered the jet stream. These 200-250 knot winds blowing west to east reduced speed over the ground to a crawl and were too fast for the Norden bombsight to compensate; bombing was thus highly inaccurate.

3. The attacks were not really affecting the Japanese war effort in any case, because Japanese industry was dispersed into small "home factories" throughout its cities. Each mom-and-pop place had a lathe or a drill press, and made one piece part, which was then sent to dispersed sub-assembly plants, which then forwarded its subassemblies to dispersed final assembly plants. This had the effect of turning entire cities into industrial plants--and thus, legitimate military targets.

4. Curtis LeMay, the new commander of XXI Bomber Command in the Marianas, having tried high-altitude daylight precision bombing, determined it was not working and took a radically different approach--low altitude area bombing at night, using incendiary payloads. He reasoned that Japanese cities, being built mainly of wood and paper, were particularly vulnerable to fire, and that, lacking effective radar-directed light anti-aircraft guns and night fighters, the Japanese defenses would be weaker if the bombers went in at 9000 vs. 30,000 feet. Moreover, at low altitude, the bombers could carry heavier payloads, and their engines would not be as prone to failure.

5. LeMay's tactics were wildly successful. A raid on Tokyo on 9-10 March 1944 burned out 16 square miles of the city and killed more than 100,000 people. Subsequent raids on other cities did not inflict nearly as many casualties, but did manage to destroy between 65 and 90% of all buildings within them. Japanese industrial production plummeted as stockpiles of pieceparts dwindled. But the Japanese high command refused to contemplate surrender.

6. While the fire bombing raids continued, the U.S. invaded first Iwo Jima and then Okinawa, encountering fanatical resistance and very heavy casualties. The Philippines and Okinawa also saw the advent of the Kamikaze, which terrified U.S. troops and inflicted heavy casualties on our ships. Men planning Operation Downfall, the invasion of Japan, took these factors into account in their estimation of casualties.

7. In July 1945, the U.S. successfully tested an atomic bomb at Alamogordo, New Mexico. For some months prior to that, a special Targeting Committee had identified prospective targets for the new weapon. The U.S. wanted a "virgin" target, untouched by conventional bombing (to measure its effects), with legitimate military targets within its boundaries, yet large enough to ensure that the bomb would not miss it entirely. The cities chosen were Hiroshima, Yokohama, Kokura and Kyoto--the latter soon scratched from the list because of its cultural treasures. Yokohama was a major seaport, shipyard, industrial center and naval base; Hiroshima was a logistic center, army headquarters and communications hub; Kokura was a major arsenal city. All of these were legitimate targets, and, if not reserved for the atomic missions, would have been burned out LeMay's incendiary campaign.

8. Alternatives to bombing a city were not realistic. These included staging a demonstration for Japanese observers at some deserted island. There were only two operational bombs. There had been only one previous test. What if the bomb was a dud? What if the Japanese did not believe the explosion was caused by an atomic bomb? What if they just didn't give a fig? Considering their response to the bombing of Hiroshima, the last was most likely of all.

9. The bombing of Hiroshima inflicted 70,000 fatalities, mostly due to the failure of people to take cover in air raid shelters and to heed warning leaflets dropped on the city in the preceding weeks. After the attack, the Japanese high command first did not credit the level of destruction, then discounted it--if Japan could survive an atomic bomb, it could survive anything. The U.S. waited for three days to hear if Japan would accept the Potsdam Declaration, then sent out a second strike.

10. Nagasaki was not the primary target. Major Charles Sweeney was dispatched to Kokura. Shortly after takeoff, he discovered that one of his fuel tanks was not feeding the engines, but elected to continue the mission. Arriving at Kokura, he found it covered by clouds. Since the rules for atomic missions required visual bombing, he flew to Nagasaki, the secondary target, but found it also covered by clouds. He circled for a while, and almost had to leave due to fuel shortage, when a small hole opened in the cloud, allowing his bombardier to make a hurried bomb run. The bomb landed far off target, 3 km northwest of the planned aim point. This, plus the hilly terrain of the city (which shielded portions of it from the blast wave) resulted in only 40,000 casualties, despite the higher explosive yield of the plutonium bomb.

11. Despite some wild conspiracy theories, Nagasaki was not a major Catholic center; there were very few Christians in Japan at all, the religion having been suppressed first by Hideyoshi and then the Tokogawa in the 16th and 17th centuries. Harry Truman's membership in the Masons had nothing to do with the selection of Nagasaki--the target list was drawn up long before Truman was informed of the Manhattan Project, and in any case, it wasn't the primary target. But Hal Wallis says a lot of stupid things.

12. Despite two atomic bombings, the Japanese military was still not ready to surrender. They deduced (correctly) that the U.S. probably did not have any more bombs (the third bomb would not be available until September), and in any case, it wasn't significantly different from a conventional firebombing. Emperor Hirohito begged to disagree, and decided to broadcast a surrender statement.

13. Even then, the military refused to accept, and staged an abortive coup to seize the Emperor and prevent the broadcast. It failed only because an American bombing raid on Tokyo caused a power failure in the Imperial Palace, during which one of Hirohito's aids was able to smuggle out a recording of the surrender statement and get it to a radio station. Only then did Japan surrender.

15. Those who declare the atomic bombing immoral have to take into account the alternatives--realistic alternatives, not wishful thinking based on post-hoc assumptions. In August 1945, there were really only three viable alternatives to using the atomic bombs on Japanese cities. These were:

a. Continuation of conventional bombing
b. Blockade
c. Invasion

16. Conventional bombing had failed to move the Japanese towards surrender, and was reaching the point of diminishing returns (we were running out of cities). Cumulative casualties would probably exceed those of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which together with the other cities reserved for the atomic bombs, would have been attacked with conventional incendiaries/

17. Blockade would have required the seizing of Formosa, the mining of all inland waterways and ports, and the interdiction of any shipping attempting to run the blockade. This would have exposed allied aircraft and warships to continual attack by Kamikazes and other means, with significant losses in ships, aircraft and personnel. Undoubtedly the war would have continued into 1946, at a time when support for the war effort was waning. More significantly, the blockade would have killed millions of Japanese, mostly civilians. The Japanese military had considered the possibility of blockade, and had drawn up plans to eliminate "useless mouths"--the very young, the very old, the sick and crippled, the mentally impaired and, of course, all surviving Allied POWs. Those who advocate blockade should remember that, in any siege, the soldiers starve last.

18. Invasion. Casualty estimates for Operation Downfall (the invasion of Japan) and its subsidiary operations Olympic (the invasion of Kyushu) and Coronet (the invasion of Honshu) were not exaggerated. They were based on losses incurred in the Philippines, Iwo Jima and Okinawa--especially the latter. Japan is a mountainous country, and there are relatively few beaches suitable for amphibious invasion. The Japanese had deduced where we were going to land, and were massing reinforcements and building fortifications at those points. Most of the reinforcements came from the crack Kwantung Army in China (which is why the Soviets had a walkover when they invaded Manchuria). The Japanese had stockpiled all sorts of weapons, upwards of 4000 kamikaze aircraft and hundreds of suicide motorboats and midget submarines. Every able-bodied civilian was enrolled in a local defense corps, armed with rudimentary rifles and even sharpened bamboo stakes; all were instructed to fight to the death, taking at least one Yankee devil with him.

The U.S. was monitoring the buildup of Japanese forces on Kyushu through MAGIC communications intercepts, and it was projected that on X-Day, the Japanese would actually outnumber us on the landing beaches. When one considers that the U.S. outnumbered the Germans 5-to-1 on Omaha Beach, the outcome of X-Day becomes a scary proposition.

General George C. Marshall, looking for a way to equal the odds, modified the plans to include the use of nine (9) atomic bombs as tactical weapons detonated just behind the beaches to destroy Japanese defensive positions. U.S. troops would storm ashore and pass through the bombed area 72 hours later. Since the Japanese defenses were sited in and among civilian population centers, casualties from the preliminary bombardment alone would have exceeded those of Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined. Moreover, since we knew so little about radiation effects, many U.S. troops would have become casualties from the fallout of our own bombs.

Assuming we fought our way off the beaches, we would then have to clear out every last city, town and village in Japan, and probably find ourselves fighting a guerrilla war in the mountains, lasting at least into 1947. U.S. casualties would have exceeded one million (about 25% dead), and the Japanese several million, most of whom would be dead.

19. To sum up: of the options available, continued conventional bombing would have killed several hundred thousand more Japanese, without any conclusive result. Blockade would have killed several million Japanese civilians, and still would not have yielded a guaranteed surrender; moreover, Allied casualties would have numbered in the tens of thousands, at least. Invasion would have been a holocaust of death for both sides, with at least a quarter of a million U.S. dead, and several million Japanese dead, mainly civilians; in addition, Japan would have become a radioactive wasteland, the Soviet Union would have occupied the northern islands, and the Japanese economic miracle would never have happened.

20. In light of the alternatives, the use of the atomic bomb against Hiroshima and Nagasaki emerges as the surest, most humane and most moral way of ending the war anyone could have contrived at the time. If anyone reading this can think of a better way that can survive the scrutiny of military and historical analysis, I would be pleased to evaluate it.

[Ethan C.]

Here is the thread that the previous post refers to. It's gigantically long but definitely worth it, in my opinion.

[Ethan C.]

My personal thoughts on this matter can be found in short form on the two discussion threads on this same topic over on First Things (first, second).

In brief:

1. WWII Japan was a militarized culture, so it's difficult to argue that the residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were "innocent civilians" in any meaningful sense.

2. The anti-bombing argument asserts that trying to justify the decision to bomb requires a fundamentally different sort of moral reasoning than trying to justify the decision to take some other action. However, I think the bombing can be justified according to the same Just War-based argumentation that its opponents deploy against it.

[Benighted Savage]

a well informed former MC poster writes:

It diverted huge amounts of resources in manpower and munitions to anti-aircraft defense which otherwise could have been used against Allied ground forces. Consider that something like 1 million German troops were manning some 10,000 flak guns, each of which could also be used as an anti-tank gun. If each of those guns killed just one tank, the war would have gone on much longer.

Excellent point (one of many). Let me add to this from Robin Neillands' _The Bomber War_, pp.384-385:

Germany had to devote vast resources to fending off the bombers. For the defense of the Reich, Goering had to deploy 8,876 of the formidable 88 mm flak guns, the most effective artillery piece of the war, and one which, when supplied with armor-piercing ammunition, was equally effective against tanks. The flak units also deployed some 25,000 pieces of 20 mm and 30 mm cannon. To put these figures in perspective, Rommel's Afrika Corps, about to attack the British in the Western Desert in the autumn of 1941, had just 35 of these useful 88 mm guns. To man these guns, the flak regiments in Germany required some 900,000 fit men; Rommel's army for the defense of Normandy in 1944 numbered around 500,000 men...

The effects of strategic bombing [when compared with tactical bombing] are harder to gauge, because the results come more slowly. It is the gradual degradation of the enemy's military-industrial complex, the destruction of the means for normal life to continue, the need to divert resources in guns and aircraft to home defense that represent the true contribution of the strategic bomber to the overall conduct and outcome of a war.

Because such results are neither immediate nor clear-cut, the benefits of a strategic air campaign are less easy to verify, but that strategic bombing had a considerable effect on the outcome of the Second World War cannot be denied. By 1944, resisting the bombing offensive was costing Germany 30 per cent of all artillery produced, 20 per cent of all heavy shells, 33 per cent of the output of the optical industry for sights and aiming devices, and 50 per cent of the country's total electro-technical output, all of which had to be diverted to the anti-aircraft role.(my emphasis)

Let me conclude here with the words of RAF Bomber Command navigator and historian Noble Frankland:

"The great immorality open to us in 1940 and 1941 was to lose the war against Hitler's Germany. To have abandoned the only means of direct attack which we had at our disposal [i.e., strategic bombing] would have been a long step in that direction."

[Benighted Savage]

20. In light of the alternatives, the use of the atomic bomb against Hiroshima and Nagasaki emerges as the surest, most humane and most moral way of ending the war anyone could have contrived at the time. If anyone reading this can think of a better way that can survive the scrutiny of military and historical analysis, I would be pleased to evaluate it.

Perhaps another way of putting this would be to say that, by trying to end the Pacific War as quickly as they could, Truman, Stimson, Lemay et al were ultimately pursuing the intrinsic good of PEACE. And, after participating in one way or another in a hard-fought and bloody war for almost 4 years, who could blame them for wanting something as good as that. God bless them all.

[Nathan Lahey]

Not to mention that my dad was being trained to invade Japan at Parris Island in August '45. He was a 50 cal. machine gunner, second man off the landing craft and second man to be mowed down. If not for the timely bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, I most probably would not be here today. As well as the millions of souls who would not be here had their fathers been killed on the beaches of Japan.

Nathan

[Rob G]

David, I'm not inclined to accept arguments from a theorist who believes that the only thing that matters in war is whether you win or not.

The impasse here is two-fold, over the following questions: 'Is it ever permissible to target non-combatants during a war?' and 'Were non-combatants targeted during these various WWII bombings?'

I answer "no" to #1 and "yes" to #2. Based on my answer to #1 I dismiss all consequentialist objections, because consequences don't figure in: one never does evil so that good may come.

Re: #2 I would say that one has to conclude that civilian areas -- areas consisting primarily of residences, shops, churches, etc. -- were deliberately bombed. It's not like a few stray incendiaries accidentally hit some houses in Tokyo or Dresden.

Therefore, see #1

[Rob G]

It might be beneficial to check out the piece by Ed Feser titled "Happy Consequentialism Day!" over at the What's Wrong With The World site.

[Benighted Savage]

Nathan Lahey writes:

He was a 50 cal. machine gunner, second man off the landing craft and second man to be mowed down.

I'm sure that if Truman had gone ahead with the invasion of Japan (Downfall) and your father had been killed on the beach, at least he would have died happy knowing that future generations would be less likely to consider Truman and the Joint Chiefs to be ethical consequentialists.

Seriously though, the telling fact here is that to the anti-consequentialist IT (almost) DOESN'T MATTER WHAT IS DONE to conclude the Pacific War with Japan: the US would always be in the wrong. The other likely options, blockade and invasion, would result in hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of civilian deaths, and so no matter which option were chosen the anti-consequentialist would still claim that the US had wrongly sacrificed innocent lives to achieve its wartime goals. Thus, ANY defense of US actions would be identified as consequentialist and therefore inadmissable.

I wrote "almost" because there are at least two options for ending the war which would (probably) have allowed the US to evade the anti-consequentialist spiderweb: either the US surrenders to the Emperor of Japan in '45, or else the US agrees to an armistice with the Japanese on Japan's terms (i.e., no Allied occupation of the home islands, no giving up of the colonial possession, no dismantling of the Imperial army and navy, etc.). Which goes to show what sort of deep, dark space the WWII anti-consequentialists are arguing from.

I have no patience for this sort of argumentation. In relation to the US's role in WWII, it has been a "weapon of choice" shared by Fascist propagandists, Soviet propagandists, befuddled pacifists and boneheaded Christians.

[William Tighe]

I am mildly surprised that the notion of "unconditional surrender" has not once been criticized on this thread. One might think that God is the only "entity" that has a moral claim to demand unconditional surrender -- but perhaps, given the expressions of "Neanderthal Christianity" on this thread and the implicit quasi-deification of the State (so long as it is "democratic") that is not a surprise, after all.

[Rob G]

I'd thought about it, Bill, but figured it might just muddy the waters even more. It is an important consideration, though.

[c matt]

If not for the timely bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, I most probably would not be here today. As well as the millions of souls who would not be here had their fathers been killed on the beaches of Japan.

That can be argued both ways - what about the millions of souls who in fact ARE NOT here because their ancestors perished in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings?

[c matt]

In brief:

1. WWII Japan was a militarized culture, so it's difficult to argue that the residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were "innocent civilians" in any meaningful sense.

Are you saying the US was not a militarized culture - have you not seen the newsreels, propaganda and war effort advertisements from that era? Practically every American was involved. A more militarized culture would have been difficult to find.

[Nathan]

That can be argued both ways - what about the millions of souls who in fact ARE NOT here because their ancestors perished in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings?

Those 'ancestors', in the following seasons, would most likely have lost, fighting to the death in the defense of their homeland. The pattern of decendancy would have changed for the worse as all coastal and wayfaring towns would have lost as well.

[Benighted Savage]

William Tighe writes:

I am mildly surprised that the notion of "unconditional surrender" has not once been criticized on this thread. One might think that God is the only "entity" that has a moral claim to demand unconditional surrender -- but perhaps, given the expressions of "Neanderthal Christianity" on this thread and the implicit quasi-deification of the State (so long as it is "democratic") that is not a surprise, after all.

Funny, I would have thought it more likely that the "unconditional surrender" canard hasn't been brought up because it's an issue that can be debated via reference to historical facts -- and that's the sort of debate that the Perfidious Albion/D*mned Yankees crowd on this thread have shied away from consistently.

[MCModerator]

This thread is being closed due to the increasing resort to ad hominem argument. If you can't make an argument without calling each other Neanderthals, boneheads, etc., etc., you haven't got an argument to make. Keep it civil, folks.